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The two main paradigms in cognitive science are computationalism and connectionism. 
The former takes as its starting point the analogy of the mind as a computer, and so 
attempts to describe cognition in terms of discrete symbol manipulation, in the manner 
of a digital computer. Connectionism is a more “bottom-up” approach to cognitive 
science, assuming the neurological structure of the brain to be fundamentally important. 
It is the task of this paper to demonstrate that connectionist theories of cognitive 
science face a dilemma: either they are mere descriptions of the physical 
implementation of a computationalist system, or they fail to predict and account for an 
apparently crucial and fundamental feature of human cognition, the systematicity of 
thought. 
 
First, it is necessary to outline the respects in which connectionism and 
computationalism differ in more detail. Computationalism holds that cognition occurs 
at the level of symbols, that it is syntax that does the “heavy lifting”, so to speak, when 
it comes to cognition. Connectionism is the opposite in this respect: paradigmatic 
research programs in connectionism have typically demonstrated how cognition could 
occur without the use of symbols or rules, instead utilizing base-level connections and 
node activations to describe thought processes.1 Connectionist models are parallels to 
neurological models, so the nodes in such a model can be thought of as idealizations of 
neurons. 
 
Connectionism is, at first glance, a major shift away from the traditional Turing 
Machine approach to cognitive science. In doing without symbols, it appears to be 
genuinely different from computationalism. But thought is quite clearly a semantic 
process—there is meaning in our thoughts, and any plausible cognitive account must 
explain the means by which meaning is represented, either syntactically or physically. 
The relevant difference, if any, between our two theories will come at the one point 
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where their accounts must intersect—representation. Connectionism, then, must 
demonstrate that its account of representation is significantly different from that of 
computationalism for it to be a viable upper-level account of cognition.  
 
If we find that connectionism’s account of representation is simply a mirror of a 
computationalist framework, it will turn out that connectionism is not a distinct theory 
from computationalism, but is simply an elegant solution to the problem of physical 
implementation. That is, a truly distinct connectionist model must be one in which the 
computationalist's symbols have no place. For connectionism to say merely that a 
model can do without symbols is not enough – computationalism does not seek to reify 
symbols, to show that they “exist” in the same sense as a physical substrate. Indeed, 
computationalist accounts typically ignore the way that symbols are instantiated, 
although they must be. This fact does not invalidate the computationalist project. Just as 
chemistry is not invalidated by the ability of physics to (in theory) explain chemical 
processes, computationalism is not invalidated by the ability of connectionism to 
explain in excruciating detail the processes of our brains. Whether such an account 
would truly be an explanation is open to question. What we seek to show in this paper 
is that connectionism is not an alternative to the computationalist account of cognition, 
just as physics is not an alternative to chemistry's account of chemical processes. 
 
There are two ways in which representation could occur in a complex system. They are 
as follows: 
 
1. Full atomicity of thought processes: cognition and thoughts like “Sam 
has a full head of hair” are fully undecomposable.  
 
2. Thoughts of the above sort can be decomposed into their component 
concepts: Sam, to have, hair, and so on. 
 
These two mutually exclusive accounts of representation will be referred to as 
atomicity and compositionality of thought, respectively. Because compositionality of 
thought is simply the negation of the atomicity hypothesis, these are the only two 
options to consider. Both end up failing to distinguish connectionism from 
computationalism in a substantive way. 
 
The first, atomicity, falls to an objection first laid out by Fodor and Pylyshyn2, called 
systematicity. Briefly, systematicity is the following property of thought: one’s ability 
to form new thoughts is intricately related to one’s ability to form other thoughts. The 
ability to form a set of thoughts P, Q, R… is sufficient for the ability to form similar 
thoughts P`, Q`, R`… where P`… are composed of the same atomic concepts as P, Q, 
R… As an example, Fodor and Pylyshyn consider a (highly simplified) thought of the 
sort “P&Q”. Systematicity says that if we can form this thought, we can form similar 
thoughts like “P”, “Q”, and (maybe) “&”. 
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This thesis about the nature of thought is highly plausible. For it is inconceivable that 
one be able to think “The dog ate the homework” and not be able to form other 
thoughts about the dog, or the homework. Fodor and Pylyshyn point to the apparent 
impossibility of a natural cognitive system not satisfying systematicity, as evidenced by 
the strong systematicity of language (which is empirically demonstrable). 
 
Atomicity of representation is incompatible with this systematicity condition, however. 
Under atomicity, “The dog ate the homework” is a monolithic entity, which cannot be 
decomposed into its component parts. Compositionality of thought is a necessary 
condition for this systematicity, because without compositionality, the similar thoughts 
guaranteed by systematicity might not even exist. While an atomic mind might very 
well be able to think about the dog, this is by no means guaranteed, because the ability 
to form one atomic thought is not sufficient for the ability to form others. 
 
An argument against an atomic, connectionist account of thought might therefore 
proceed as follows: 
 
(1) Naturally occurring cognition is systematic, as evidenced by the 
systematicity of language, and the strong intuitive plausibility of the 
systematicity hypothesis. 
 
(2) Any account of cognition must take into account how cognition actually 
happens in nature, and so, by (1), must satisfy systematicity. 
 
(3) A necessary condition for the systematicity of thought is 
compositionality of representation, so by (2) any account of cognition 
must take representation to be compositional. 
 
(4) Atomicity of thought is incompatible with compositionality, so by (3) 
any plausible account of cognition cannot be atomic. 
 
There are two potential objections to this argument. The first is with (1)—the 
systematicity of language is a strong reason to think that thought, too, is systematic, but 
this does not constitute an airtight argument. The systematicity of thought is going to be 
an empirical question. However, we can say that the systematicity hypothesis seems far 
more plausible than the alternative, simply because it is difficult to imagine a consistent 
psychology that is not systematic. 
 
A second possible objection to the argument takes issue with (3). This possibility is 
hinted at by Fodor and Pylyshyn in their original paper outlining the systematicity 
objection to connectionism. The idea is that the connectionist could specify that given 
any representation of thought aRb, the system contains a, R, and b as separate 
representations. That is, the presence of an atomic representation of “P&Q” (by virtue 
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of the structure of the system, or just by stipulation) implies the presence of all similar 
representations needed for systematicity. But atomic representations seem to carry no 
structural information about their contents, indeed, no information whatsoever that is 
accessible to the system. So there is no way that systematicity-with-atomicity can be 
guaranteed structurally.3
 
 
The connectionist can respond to this by saying that perhaps the pattern of nodal 
activations that represents the thought aRb does carry structural information about its 
“contents” a, R, and b. Either these three elements always fire together, so that they are 
in practice inseparable, or a more cohesive activation pattern for aRb only gives “clues” 
about the information it represents. Both of these are ways that a connectionist model 
can guarantee that systematicity is satisfied by atomic representation. But in providing 
such a mechanism, we have sacrificed all semblance of elegance or economy. Such a 
system would never actually arise.  
 
Compositionality appears to be the only recourse left for the connectionist. Atomicity is 
invalid because it fails to satisfy systematicity, except in an extremely ad hoc manner, 
so any account of cognition that does not jettison systematicity outright will have to 
make do with compositionality. But this does not avail the connectionist anything, 
because any theory that takes a compositional account of representation will be, 
fundamentally, computationalist. The reason for this isomorphism is due to the 
fundamental difference between the two theories: computationalism does the hard work 
with symbols, while connectionism works at a subsymbolic level. 
 
What would compositionality mean for a connectionist model? It would simply mean 
that representations can be broken up into identifiable and distinct components at the 
physical level.4 Every atomic concept (P, the dog, etc.) is represented by a physical 
pattern of nodal activations. Compositional representations (full sentences, e.g.) are 
composed of numerous patterns of activation firing in concert. Each of these 
representational components (“P”, the dog, etc.) will have causal power at the level of 
implementation, of connections and nodes.5
 
 So cognition, for the connectionist, is 
tokening of these “pieces” of representation at the physical level. Already the 
connectionist model seems to have lost some of its uniqueness – we can point to one 
pattern of activation and say that the system is thinking about the classic Wilco album 
Yankee Hotel Foxtrot. The idea behind connectionism is, at least partially, that this 
should not be possible, that inputs go in and outputs come out, and that only the system 
knows what happens in between. But it is still unclear that what we have is a 
computationalist system. 
For our compositional connectionist system to also be computationalist, symbols 
representing elements of cognition would have to be able to effect other symbols, also 
representing elements of cognition. Where do the symbols appear? The answer is that 
they already have! If we were to draw a (high-level) map of our connectionist network, 
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no one could fault us for simply writing Yankee Hotel Foxtrot instead of drawing the 
whole map of nodes that corresponds to that album, and doing the same for other 
representations. Such a map would be, for certain purposes, just as useful if not more 
useful than the more detailed, node-by-node map. The result would be a set of boxed 
keywords (or symbols), connected by lines of activation, just like a connectionist graph, 
but at a more abstract level. 
 
Naturally, it is not the case that the symbols can be said to actually have causal power 
to effect cognition. A physicalist account of cognition will have to admit that causality 
originates most fundamentally in the physical substrate of cognition. But insofar as we 
can call reliable correlation causation, it makes sense to speak of symbols “causing” 
other symbols, in the sense that the one is always and necessarily followed by the other. 
 
This is just what we mean when we speak of a computationalist model. 
Computationalism seeks to provide a more abstract account of the same phenomena as 
connectionism. It is to connectionism what chemistry is to physics. If a symbolic 
account is theoretically useful, then connectionism has not unseated computationalism. 
 
In short, compositionality entails computationalism, because in any system of 
representation where symbols are free to combine, recombine, and act as part of a wide 
variety of thoughts, processes at the symbolic level will be just as complex as those at 
the lower level. There is a symmetry between lower-level physical processes and upper 
level processes which is only avoided by an atomic account of representation. But since 
atomicity is incompatible with systematicity, it turns out that a symbolic account of 
cognition is just as relevant and useful as a neurologically motivated one. Connectionist 
architecture is merely implementing the computationalist system. 
 
It is seen that connectionism, plausibly construed, can be nothing more than an 
implementation of computationalist symbol manipulation architecture. Indeed, the only 
difference between the two theories is that connectionism, at first, seems to be atomic 
in its account of representation. But this turns out to be unsystematic, and no hope at all 
for connectionism as a unique and significant contribution to cognitive science. 
 
                                                          
1  An example is On Learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs, by Rumelhart and McClelland. Their 
system uses no rules in modeling the learning process observed in children for the past tense in English. 
 
2 Fodor and Pylyshyn, Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis 
 
3 The possibility that the systematicity is designed into the system barely merits consideration—
obviously once we allow our cognitive theories to include designers, we can make do with any sort of 
crazy theory. 
 
4  If we cannot break up representations in this way, we just have atomicity. 
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5 This is necessary for systematicity to obtain, that each “piece” of a representation be independent and 
causally powerful. 
